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conducted by an individual or corporation." The court decided
the instant case under the provisions of this act and held that a
state having the power of taxing a business conducted by a trustee on an equal footing with other businesses, must, in order to
realize this equality, be given the power to impose penalties for
delinquencies.
It is submitted that the 1934 act 5 was designed only to permit
the assessment of trustees and receivers under general tax statutes and it does not purport to remove any of the restrictions
imposed by Section 57 (j) relating to the provability of penalties.
Applying the well-settled rule of construction that tax statutes
should not be extended by implication,6 it might well have been
assumed that had Congress intended to allow liens for tax penalties incurred by the trustee to be secured against the estate, it
would have declared such intention in the act. Since the provision
in Section 57 (j) is for the benefit of the creditors and purports to
protect the bankrupt estate from the imposition of penalties and
forfeitures which are punitive in nature, it is difficult to find a
sound practical reason for a distinction between penalties accruing
against the bankrupt and those accruing against the trustee.
H. B.

CORPORATIONS-VALIDITY OF CONTRACTS BETWEEN CORPORATION
AND DIRECTOR OR OFFICER-A corporation purchased an automobile
from plaintiff, payment being secured by a promissory note and
vendor's lien. The car was subsequently sold to the corporation's
president and manager, who in turn sold it to defendant. Plaintiff
sued to enforce the vendor's lien. In holding that the vendor's
lien was extinguished by sale and delivery of the car, the court
stated that an officer or director can contract with the corporation
if the transaction is fair and in good faith. General Motors Acceptance Corporationv. Hahn, 190 So. 869 (La. App. 1939).
Generally a contract entered into between a corporation and
one of its officers or directors is voidable at the option of the corporation without regard to the fairness of the transaction or the
good faith of the officer or director.1 This rule is subject to the
5. See note 4, supra.
6. In re Flatbush Gum Co., Inc., 73 F. (2d) 283 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1934), cert.
denied, New York v. Arnold, 294 U.S. 713, 55 S.Ct. 509, 79 L.Ed. 1247 (1935).

1. Massoth v. Central Bus Corp., 104 Conn. 683, 134 Atl. 236 (1926); Frankford Exchange Bank v. McCune, 72 S.W. (2d) 155 (Mo. App. 1934); Shaw v.
Crandon State Bank, 145 Wis. 639, 129 N.W. 794 (1911). See Holcomb v. Forsyth, 216 Ala. 486, 113 So. 516, 520 (1927).
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qualification that where the corporation is represented in the
transaction by a disinterested majority of the board of directors
or other competent agents the contract is valid if it is fair to the
corporation and if, further, the officer or director has acted in
good faith. 2 However, such contracts are subject to close scrutiny
by the courts."
In accordance with the above mentioned rule, it has been
held in Louisiana that a sale of property by a corporation to one
of its directors is voidable at the option of the corporation when
unfair to it, notwithstanding the fact that the transaction was
approved by a disinterested majority of the board of directors.'
Whether or not a "fair" contract between a corporation and one
of its officers or directors is valid is a question which has not yet
been squarely presented to a Louisiana court.5 However, a corporation's deed executed by its president to himself, where made
upon an annexed resolution reciting that it had been unanimously
approved by the board of directors, was held valid on its face, so
that a good faith purchaser relying thereon would be protected.8
The dictum' in the instant case lends added weight to the
inference, which may be drawn from the above authorities,' that,
2. Aetna Indemnity Co. v. Altadena Min. Inv. Syndicate, 11 Cal. App. 26,
104 Pac. 470 (1909); Citizen's Development Co. v. Kypawava Oil Co., 191 Ky.
183, 229 S.W. 88 (1921). See Holcomb v. Forsyth, 216 Ala. 486, 113 So. 516, 520
(1927); Massoth v. Central Bus. Corp., 104 Conn. 683, 689, 134 Atl. 236, 238
(1926); Veeser v. Robinson Hotel Co., 275 Mich. 133, 137, 266 N.W. 54, 55
(1936); Frankford Exchange Bank v. McCune, 72 S.W. (2d) 155, 158 (Mo. App.
1934); Crocker v. Cumberland Min. & Mill Co., 31 S.D. 137, 146, 139 N.W. 783,
784-785 (1913); Williams & Miller Gin Co. v. Knuttson, 63 S.W. (2d) 576, 577
(Tex. Civ. App. 1933). See also 3 Fletcher, Corporations (Perm. ed. 1931)
287, § 931.
3. Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 23 L.Ed. 328 (1875); Gall v.
Cowell, 118 W.Va. 263, 190 S.E. 130 (1937).
4. Crescent City Brewing Co. v. Flanner, 44 La. Ann. 22, 10 So. 384 (1892).
5. Such contracts have been declared subject to close scrutiny by the
courts. See Bland v. Paradice Colonization Co., Inc., 146 So. 778, 779 (La. App.
1933). Since such a rule would be meaningless if any contract between a
corporation and one of its officers or directors is voidable at the option of the
corporation, a strong implication is raised that such a contract, if fair to the
corporation, would be valid.
6. De Soto Corp. v. Roberts Lumber & Grain Co., Inc., 174 La. 620, 141 So.
78 (1932).
7. The issue as to whether or not the corporation could have avoided the
contract does not appear to have been raised.
8. See footnotes 4, 5, and 6, supra. See further Bland v. Paradice Colonization Co., Inc., 146 So. 778, 779 (La. App. 1933), wherein the court, after holding
the evidence insufficient to prove that plaintiff was an officer or director of
defendant corporation and that for that reason the rules governing contracts
between a corporation and its officers or directors were not applicable stated:
"Furthermore, even if the above doctrine were applicable, in the face of positive testimony to the contrary, courts cannot assume that a wrong has been
done merely because a favorable opportunity for its perpetration existed."
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CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE-HOMICIDE--EVIDENCE

OF

DANGEROUS

CHARACTER AND PRIOR THREATS-In a prosecution for homicide the
defendant relied on self defense. The trial judge excluded evidence as to the dangerous character of the deceased and as to
two previous attempts upon the life of the defendant by the deceased on the ground that no "overt act" was shown to have
been committed by the latter. On appeal, affirmed: (1) an overt
act is a hostile demonstration of such a character as to create in
the mind of a reasonable person the belief that he is in immediate danger of losing his life or suffering bodily harm;1 (2) the
proof of such hostile demonstration must be made to the satisfaction of the trial judge subject to the review of the Supreme
Court before the evidence is admissible. 2 State v. Stracner, 190
La. 457, 187 So. 571 (1938).t
Ordinarily in a trial for homicide evidence of prior threats
or the dangerous character of the deceased are inadmissible.8
However, if the defendant claims the killing was in self defense,
it becomes incumbent on him to satisfy the jury that he acted
in a reasonable belief that he was in imminent danger of life or
limb at the time he perpetrated the homicide. Hence his knowledge of the dangerous character of the deceased or threats on
the defendant's life made by him and communicated to the latter
are admissible for this purpose.4 Furthermore in some jurisdictions, though the defendant had no knowledge of such facts, evidence thereof is admissible for the purpose of determining
whether the deceased or the accused was the aggressor.8
t See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1937-1938 Term
(1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 314, 383.

1. Accord: State v. Brown, 172 La. 121, 133 So. 383 (1931); State v. Jones,
175 La. 1066, 145 So. 9 (1932).
2. Accord: State v. Brown, 172 La. 121, 133 So. 383 (1931); State v. Scarbrock, 176 La. 48, 145 So. 264 (1932); State v. Boudreaux, 185 La. 434, 169
So. 459 (1936).
3. Wharton, Criminal Evidence (11 ed. 1935) § 339.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. This exception has not been made in Louisiana generally, yet
some few early cases held that such evidence was admissible to show who
was the aggressor. State v. Robinson, 52 La. Ann. 616, 27 So. 124 (1900);
State v. Lindsay, 122 La. 375, 47 So. 687 (1908); State v. Barksdale, 122 La.
788, 48 So. 264 (1909).

